U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
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Washington, D.C. 20536

[redacted]

identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

File: [redacted] Office: NEWARK, NJ Date: 13 DEC 2001

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

Application: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(i)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

Public Copy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of $110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Acting Director
Administrative Appeals Office

[redacted]

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Newark, New Jersey, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of the Philippines who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant is married to a naturalized United States citizen and is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative. She seeks the above waiver in order to remain in the United States and reside with her spouse, child, an step-children.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel states that the district director abused his discretion in denying the applicant's waiver request as the social and humane considerations present in the case for outweigh the applicant's undesirability as a permanent resident.

The record reflects that the applicant procured admission into the United States on October 25, 1990 by presenting a Philippine passport containing a U.S. nonimmigrant visa in an assumed name.

Section 212(a) of the Act states:

> CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.- Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:
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> * * *
>
> (6) ILLEGAL ENTRANTS AND IMMIGRATION VIOLATORS.-
>
> * * *
>
> (C) MISREPRESENTATION.-
>
> (i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act states:

> ADMISSION OF IMMIGRANT INADMISSIBLE FOR FRAUD OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT.-
>
> (1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.
>
> (2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) violation due to passage of time. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered. See Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996; A.G. 1997).

If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. Matter of George and Lopez-Alvarez, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); Matter of Leveque, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for section 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, Interim Decision 3380 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the

United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

In Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation.

The court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

On appeal, counsel asserts that there is an abundance of favorable factors warranting a favorable exercise of discretion in this case such as the applicant's strong family ties in the United States; the fact that she has resided in the United States over ten years and was twenty-one years of age at the time of her fraudulent entry; the hardship she and her family will suffer if she is removed from the United States; her stable employment history, property and business ties, and the value and service she has provided to the community in the United States; and her good moral character.

Counsel states that the applicant has a husband, a child, two step-children, a mother, a father, a brother and a sister-in-law, twelve aunts and uncles, and twenty-five cousins in the United States and that if she is forced to leave she will have no place to live in the Philippines and no means to support herself and her family. Counsel continues that if the applicant were removed to the Philippines, she would have to go back to school for four years to become a nurse, her income would decrease substantially, and her husband would no longer have her assistance in the support of his children from a prior marriage.

The assertion of financial hardship to the applicant's spouse advanced in the record is contradicted by the fact that, pursuant to section 213A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1183a, and the regulations at 8 C.F.R. 213a, the person who files an application for an immigrant visa or for adjustment of status on or after December 19, 1997 must execute a Form I-864 (Affidavit of Support) which is legally enforceable in behalf of a beneficiary (the applicant) who is an immediate relative or a family-sponsored immigrant when an applicant applies for an immigrant visa. The statute and the regulations do not provide for an alien beneficiary to execute an affidavit of support in behalf of a U.S. citizen or resident alien petitioner. Therefore, a claim that an alien beneficiary is needed for the purpose of supporting a citizen or resident alien petitioner can only be considered as a hardship in rare instances.

It is noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in Matter of Tijam, Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998), need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. The applicant in the present matter entered the United States in 1990 by fraud and married her spouse, also a native of the Philippines, in 1999. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. However, as previously noted, a consideration of the Attorney General's discretion is applicable only after extreme hardship has been established.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that her spouse (the only qualifying relative in this case) would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in the removal of a family member. Hardship to the applicant herself, her children, step-children or various family members is not a consideration in these proceedings. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application of waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Matter of T-S-Y-, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.